Jump To Navigation

News

News

Top Headlines

[03/10] Feds probe Toyota Prius crash in NYC suburb
[03/10] DC courthouse busy with same-sex applications
[03/10] 'Jihad Jane' indictment shows terror's evolution
[03/10] Judge: NYC can keep 'Tavern on the Green' name
[03/10] Mass. court upholds state gun-lock requirement

More...

Business

[03/10] Greek strike to shut down services Thursday
[03/10] Oligarch wins suit against Russian broadcaster
[03/10] World stocks up modestly; pound takes another hit
[03/10] Nationalized UK bank Northern Rock back in profit
[03/10] Meatpackers say inspection cuts are shortsighted

More...

Energy

[03/10] Ingersoll Rand Leader Shares Innovative Technologies at Great Energy Efficiency Day 2010
[03/10] Oilsands Quest provides highlights of third quarter operational update and announces Chief Reservoir Engineer appointment
[03/10] ReneSola Ltd Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2009 Results
[03/10] Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index(TM) Reveals Disappointing February, Potentially Dampened by Record Snowfalls
[03/10] OPEC raises 2010 oil demand forecast

More...

Case Summaries

Contracts

[03/10] Anchor Sav. Bank, FSB v. US
In one of the last Winstar cases arising out of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, involving a plaintiff's suit alleging that the adoption of the FIRREA and its implementing regulations breached the government's obligations under supervisory merger contracts, judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed in part and remanded in part where: 1) the trial court did not commit clear err in finding that it was foreseeable that the breach would result in lost profits to plaintiff in an amount commensurate with the ultimate award for lost profits; 2) the trial court did not err in finding of a causal connection between the government's breach of contract and plaintiff's sale of RFC (a mortgage banking company); 3) the trial court did not err in awarding lost profit damages attributable to plaintiff's forced sale of RFC; 4) the trial court permissibly concluded that NAMCO (mortgage company) was a reasonable commercial substitute for RFC, and its purchase thus qualified as mitigation for the loss of RFC; but 5) the case is remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether an error was made in offsetting plaintiff's mitigation costs by NAMCO's retained earnings through 1997 and, if so, how to correct the error.

[03/10] Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. American Int'l Specilaty Lines Ins. Co.
In a sewerage district's suit for damages against an environmental liability insurer for denying coverage for costs incurred by the district in removing significant pollution on land it recently purchased, district court's judgment is reversed and remanded as the district court's finding that there was clear and convincing proof that a prior agreement existed between the insurance company and the sewerage district that the parcel would be covered property was clearly erroneous. Therefore, defendant is entitled to judgment on the sewerage district's reformation claim and, as a consequence, judgment in favor of defendant on its indemnity claim is vacated.

[03/10] Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.
In an appeal from a district court's order granting plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoining defendant from proceeding with an arbitration initiated against plaintiff before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the order is affirmed where the "serious questions" standard for assessing a movant's likelihood of success on the merits remains valid in the wake of recent Supreme Court cases, and neither the district court's assessment of the facts nor its application of the law supported a finding of abuse of discretion.

[03/09] Seltzer v. Barnes
Trial court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, arising from an underlying suit involving claims against a property management company and homeowners' association, is reversed where: 1) the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff's two causes of action against defendant do not arise from speech or petitioning activity where his alleged conduct was the negotiation of a settlement in the prior case; and 2) because defendant may not be held liable for the alleged conduct under the litigation privilege, plaintiff has failed to show a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[03/09] San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. SEIU Local 790
Superior court's order vacating an arbitration award in its entirety on the ground that the the award is contrary to layoff provisions of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties is reversed as the remedy imposed by the arbitrator did not conflict with clear and explicit language of the MOU and it was rationally related to the breach identified.

More...

Environmental Law

[03/10] Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. American Int'l Specilaty Lines Ins. Co.
In a sewerage district's suit for damages against an environmental liability insurer for denying coverage for costs incurred by the district in removing significant pollution on land it recently purchased, district court's judgment is reversed and remanded as the district court's finding that there was clear and convincing proof that a prior agreement existed between the insurance company and the sewerage district that the parcel would be covered property was clearly erroneous. Therefore, defendant is entitled to judgment on the sewerage district's reformation claim and, as a consequence, judgment in favor of defendant on its indemnity claim is vacated.

[03/09] Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell
In an action challenging the Forest Service's approval of a project to update grazing allotments in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where: 1) because the Forest Service's environmental assessment was based on a nonexistent management indicator species, its habitat proxy analysis was not reliable; and 2) the Forest Service failed to take the requisite "hard look" at the project as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.

[03/08] Kane Cty. v. US
In an appeal from the denial of plaintiffs' motion to intervene in an action brought by Kane County, Utah, to quiet title to several purported rights-of-way across federal public lands, the order is affirmed where: 1) even assuming plaintiffs had an interest in the quiet title proceedings at issue, plaintiffs failed to establish that the U.S. could not adequately represent plaintiffs' interest; and 2) the denial of permissive intervention was not arbitrary and capricious.

[03/08] Morris v. US Nuclear Reg. Comm'n.
In a petition for review of a license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct in situ leach mining for uranium on four sites in northwest New Mexico, the petition is denied where: 1) the clear language of 10 C.F.R. section 20.1301(a)(1) supported the NRC's decision to focus only on the licensed operation; 2) the National Environmental Policy Act did not prohibit approval of projects with negative cumulative effects; it only required that the agency consider and disclose such effects; and 3) there was no evidence in the administrative record to support petitioners' assertion that the NRC based its adoption of the nine-pore-volume restoration effort on economic reasons.

[03/04] MacClarence v. EPA
In a petition for review of the EPA's order denying petitioner's request that the EPA object to the issuance of a Clean Air Act Title V permit for pollutant-emitting activities at an oil and gas processing facility, the petition is denied where: 1) the EPA Administrator's conclusion that petitioner failed to provide adequate information to support his claim that the entire facility should be aggregated was not arbitrary or capricious; and 2) the Administrator's order denying the petition properly set forth petitioner's burden under 42 U.S.C. section 7661d(b)(2), stating that "to justify exercise of an objection by EPA to a title V permit pursuant to section 7661d(b)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the permit is not in compliance with the requirements of the CAA" and later concluding that "the general allegations of the Petitioner in the April 2004 Petition . . . fail to demonstrate a basis for Petitioner's claim that Revision 1 to the GC 1 Permit violates the CAA . . . ."

More...

Labor & Employment Law

[03/09] San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. SEIU Local 790
Superior court's order vacating an arbitration award in its entirety on the ground that the the award is contrary to layoff provisions of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties is reversed as the remedy imposed by the arbitrator did not conflict with clear and explicit language of the MOU and it was rationally related to the breach identified.

[03/09] Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
In an employment discrimination and retaliation action brought by a teacher at a religious school claiming violations of the ADA, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on the "ministerial exception" is vacated and remanded as, given the factual findings relating to plaintiff's primary duties as a teacher, the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying her as a ministerial employee.

[03/08] McBeth v. Himes
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action arising out of an investigation by the sheriff's office and the Colorado Department of Human Services that resulted in plaintiff surrendering her license to run a daycare facility in Colorado, partial summary judgment based on qualified immunity to defendant-officials is affirmed in part where: 1) plaintiff voluntarily relinquished her license before any suspension proceedings could take place; and 2) defendants made a prima facie showing that they acted objectively reasonably when they sought suspension of plaintiff's daycare license. However, the order is reversed in part where plaintiff failed to allege and prove that the state officials lacked cause to seek suspension of her license.

[03/05] Rhine v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am.
In a petition for review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board under 33 U.S.C. section 921(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the petition is denied where: 1) a reasonable mind could have concluded that the Pacific Maritime Association Average adequately represented petitioner's annual earning capacity; and 2) the availability of alternative employment was determined by reference to two criteria: the claimant's physical abilities and the economic availability of particular jobs in the market.

[03/05] Quasius v. Schwan Food Co.
In an employment discrimination action, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw his dispositive admissions after the district court provided ample notice and opportunity to do so.

More...

Oil & Gas

[03/04] MacClarence v. EPA
In a petition for review of the EPA's order denying petitioner's request that the EPA object to the issuance of a Clean Air Act Title V permit for pollutant-emitting activities at an oil and gas processing facility, the petition is denied where: 1) the EPA Administrator's conclusion that petitioner failed to provide adequate information to support his claim that the entire facility should be aggregated was not arbitrary or capricious; and 2) the Administrator's order denying the petition properly set forth petitioner's burden under 42 U.S.C. section 7661d(b)(2), stating that "to justify exercise of an objection by EPA to a title V permit pursuant to section 7661d(b)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the permit is not in compliance with the requirements of the CAA" and later concluding that "the general allegations of the Petitioner in the April 2004 Petition . . . fail to demonstrate a basis for Petitioner's claim that Revision 1 to the GC 1 Permit violates the CAA . . . ."

[03/02] Mac's Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. Co.
In an action under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (Act) by service station franchisees, alleging that a petroleum franchisor, Shell, and its assignee had constructively terminated their franchises and constructively failed to renew their franchise relationships by substantially changing the rental terms that the dealers had enjoyed for years, increasing costs for many of them, a circuit court's order partially affirming judgment for plaintiffs is affirmed in part where a franchisee who signs and operates under a renewal agreement with a franchisor may not maintain a constructive nonrenewal claim under the Act. However, the court of appeals' order is reversed in part where a franchisee cannot recover for constructive termination under the Act if the franchisor's allegedly wrongful conduct did not compel the franchisee to abandon its franchise.

[02/26] Resolute Natural Resources Co. v. FERC
In a petition for review of certain orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) declining to investigate allegedly anticompetitive conduct by a refining company involving oil pipelines in New Mexico, the petition is dismissed where FERC decisions not to investigate were not subject to review.

[02/26] Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. FERC
In a petition for review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) decision to allow a pipeline to change its rates without first obtaining the FERC's approval, the petition is denied where the contract at issue specifically disclaimed the need for FERC approval of rate changes.

[02/24] Niagara Mohawk Power Assn. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
In an action to recover costs pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), summary judgment for defendants is affirmed in part where: 1) allowing plaintiff to proceed under 42 U.S.C. section 107(a) would in effect nullify the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act amendment and abrogate the requirements Congress placed on contribution claims under section 113; and 2) plaintiff did not offer evidence that it incurred costs as to certain disputed areas. However, the judgment is reversed in part where: 1) the 2003 Consent Order between plaintiff and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation qualified as "an administrative or judicially approved settlement" under section 113(f) (3)(B), and thus plaintiff was entitled to seek contribution under CERCLA; and 2) plaintiff introduced evidence that defendant's asphalt facility produced or used hazardous materials that may have been released with the asphalt at issue.

More...

Class Actions

[03/10] Hesse v. Sprint Corp.
In a class action alleging that defendant Sprint Corp. unlawfully collected a Washington state tax from Washington customers, summary judgment for defendant is vacated and remanded where a prior class action settlement challenged Sprint's billing of customers for certain federal regulatory fees, and the Washington plaintiffs' interests were not adequately represented in that litigation.

[03/03] Byers v. Intuit, Inc.
In plaintiff's putative class action on behalf of U.S. taxpayers against the IRS and a consortium of companies in the electronic tax preparation and filing industry (FFA) claiming violations of the Independent Offices Appropriations Act (IOAA) in the charging of fees in exchange for providing e-filing services, as well as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, dismissal of both claims is affirmed where: 1) the district court was correct in holding that the IOAA does not apply to the FFA members, as it only applies to a government agency and none of the exceptions in Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999) apply; and 2) the district court did not err in dismissing the Sherman Act claim as the FFA members are entitled to conduct-based implied antitrust immunity with respect to the anti-competitive action taken pursuant to the Ceiling Provisions of the 2005 Agreement with the IRS.

[03/02] Orosco v. Napolitano
In an action seeking a writ of habeas corpus to compel defendants to issue him a law enforcement certification showing his cooperation with law enforcement under 28 U.S.C. section 2241, dismissal of the complaint is affirmed where the language of section 1184(p) made it abundantly clear that the decision to issue a law enforcement certification is a discretionary one.

[03/02] Rutti v. Vermillion
In a class action on behalf of all technicians employed by defendant to install alarms in customers' cars, in which plaintiff sought compensation for the time technicians spent commuting to worksites in defendant's vehicles and for time spent on preliminary and postliminary activities performed at their homes, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed in part where: 1) pursuant to the Employment Commuter Flexibility Act, use of an employer's vehicle to commute was not compensable even if it was a condition of employment; and 2) the conditions defendant placed on plaintiff's use of its vehicle did not make his commute compensable. However, the judgment is vacated in part where, on summary judgment, the district court could not determine that plaintiff's postliminary activities were not integral to plaintiff's principal activities.

[03/02] Pfizer v. Sup. Ct.
In plaintiffs' action against Pfizer, the manufacturer of Listerine mouthwash, pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law claiming that Pfizer marketed the mouthwash in a misleading manner by representing that the use of it can replace the use of dental floss in reducing plaque and gingivitis, defendant's petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn an order certifying the class action is granted as the ruling certifying a class consisting of all persons who purchased Listerine in California during a six-month period is overbroad, and In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009), does not require a different disposition in this case.

More...

Associated Press text, photo, graphic, audio and/or video material shall not be published, broadcast, rewritten for broadcast or publication or redistributed directly or indirectly in any medium. Neither these AP materials nor any portion thereof may be stored in a computer except for personal and non-commercial use. Users may not download or reproduce a substantial portion of the AP material found on this web site. AP will not be held liable for any delays, inaccuracies, errors or omissions therefrom or in the transmission or delivery of all or any part thereof or for any damages arising from any of the foregoing.